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ABSTRACT 
Tax competition is generally defined as competition between national eco-
nomies to increase their competitiveness and attract foreign investment by 
means of tax policy. Tax policy measures that tax mobile or foreign capital at 
significantly lower rates are known as harmful tax competition. Some recent 
corrections to the tax code and proposed tax amendments in Slovenia repre-
sent an attempt to relieve the burden on the taxpayer. This paper compares 
the taxation of high income taxpayers, low income taxpayers, taxpayers with 
passive income, and the taxation of businesses in Slovenia and neighbouring 
countries. The comparison indicates that Slovenian taxpayers with a high 
income have a higher tax burden than in neighbouring countries, while low 
income taxpayers have one of the highest burdens. The same applies to pas-
sive income. The tax burden on businesses ranks in the middle. 
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1. Introduction  
 
“Tax competition” is one effect of globalisation. Tax competition is 
generally defined as competition between national economies to increase their 
competitiveness and attract foreign investment by means of their tax policy. 
Tax policy measures that tax mobile or foreign capital at significantly lower 
rates are known as harmful tax competition. Although different global 
organisations (including OECD and EU) have continually warned of the 
negative consequences of harmful tax competition, they have recently also 
pointed out the positive effects of them. The fact is that over the past decade 
most countries have lowered their highest tax rates for personal income tax 
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and have moved from a comprehensive income tax approach or offering 
special deductions for specific types of income (according to tax schedules) in 
favour of an approach (generally a dual system), in which capital income or 
gains is not taxed at progressive rates. Similar trends have also occurred in the 
taxation of corporate profits. A large number of Eastern European countries 
have abolished the progressive taxation of personal income and introduced a 
flat-tax rate, although the high social security contributions mean that one 
cannot truly speak of a flat-tax rate, but rather a special dual model for taxing 
working income.   
Over the past three years, Slovenia has undergone almost continual 
change in its tax legislation as well as intense debate on the introduction of a 
flat tax rate. Although experts have not reached a common position on the tax 
reform (or the reform of the reform), there is a commonly held view that 
labour income is overtaxed, and particularly high, and that the tax burden on 
labour must be reduced. Slovenia is not isolated from globalisation and tax 
competition leads not only towards reducing the burden on income from 
employment, but also business income and income from capital.  
This paper gives the results of different views on the existence of tax 
competition and relations with tax reforms. The main section of the paper 
compares the taxation of high income taxpayers, low income taxpayers, 
taxpayers with passive income, and the taxation of businesses in Slovenia and 
neighbouring countries.  
 
 
2. Different views on tax competition  
 
In the past the concept of tax competition was not part of the wider 
theoretical debate. Economies were relatively closed, and capital was less 
mobile. Increasing volumes of trade, the faster flow of information, increased 
mobility of production, and the removal of tax and non-tax-related restrictions 
on international business and investments, national tax systems has become 
an important element in decisions on the location of businesses and 
investments. Textbooks on public finances do not place particularly emphasis 
on tax competition, with the term appearing most frequently in relation to the 
Tiebout model, which indicates that people emigrate to countries with the 
best living conditions in terms of public goods, including tax. Globalisation has 
led to massive changes in mobility and the issue has therefore become more 
relevant. The first debates were on harmful tax competition, which is by 
definition a tax policy measure that significantly lowers the taxation of mobile 
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or foreign capital (OECD, 1998). The transfer of domicile to countries with 
favourable income tax rules, and the transfer of a company’s registered office 
to a country with low tax rates for profit and capital, is today common practice 
among wealthy individuals and large companies respectively. The OECD 
therefore passed a number of recommendations and proposals to counteract 
harmful tax competition, and also started to publish a list of countries that do 
not respect the recommendations. In 1998 EU finance ministers changed the 
corporate tax code. In its 1999 report it identified 66 tax measures as harmful 
tax competition, with 40 such measures being identified in EU member states. 
The EU is therefore working to eliminate harmful tax competition, primarily 
through tax harmonisation, but this process is slow and there is significant 
resistance from member states. Tax harmonisation is a process that does not 
just eliminate harmful tax competition, but is also an attempt to restrict any tax 
competition at all. It would be difficult to set a precise boundary between 
harmful tax competition and tax competition, as both cases involve more 
favourable taxation for taxpayers. The essential difference between the two is 
essentially that harmful tax competition is largely aimed at attracting foreign 
capital, income and assets through low or zero tax rates and creating special 
forms of taxations for individual forms of capital, particularly foreign capital. 
Tax competition, however, can be generally defined as tax policy measures to 
increase the competitiveness of a domestic economy (see Drezgi}, 2005). 
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) listed the consequences of tax competition, 
based on definitions from a number of authors: 
• tax competition leads to the effective distribution of companies 
into different regions; 
• tax competition reduces the state’s participation in the economy 
and its influence over general prosperity; 
• tax competition shifts the tax burden from mobile to immobile 
capital; 
• reducing some tax rates mitigates progressiveness and hence the 
distributory function of public finances. 
 
The OECD (1998) largely points to the negative consequences of tax 
competition, as it leads to potential disturbances in business and investment, 
and reduces global prosperity. Changing tax systems affects the national tax 
revenue potential (e.g. capital flow, leading to reduced employment) and 
changes the tax structure (higher taxation of non-mobile subjects), and 
reduces the distributory effect of taxes, which has a negative impact on 
society. OECD is therefore in favour of harmonising tax systems rather than 
tax competition. 
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McGee (2004) offers a completely different view of tax competition. Tax 
harmony, he asserts, is an attempt by rich countries to maintain high tax rates 
and to finance social programmes. Globalisation is therefore a positive trend, 
offering greater opportunities to invest anywhere in the world. Companies 
have the opportunity to select the site of their investments where the tax 
system is most favourable, which enhances their competitiveness. Countries 
with low tax rates record higher economic growth, not only due to attracting 
foreign investment, but also because more capital and revenues remain in the 
private sector, which uses funds more efficiently than the state.  
 
 
3. Tax competition and tax reform 
 
Tax reform in most countries is largely due to tax competition, as most 
reforms lead to an expansion of the tax bases (mainly to include worldwide 
income, whereby an attempt is made to tax income generated in countries 
with more favourable tax codes), and the reduction of tax rates. Tax reforms 
cover personal income tax as well as corporate income taxation. Most 
countries work to create a competitive fiscal environment, which promotes 
investment, assumption of risk and entrepreneurship, while on the other hand 
wanting to make the tax system simpler and fairer. As mentioned, most 
countries have expanded the tax base and reduced the level of taxation. In the 
taxation of personal income there is a clear trend to move from a 
comprehensive taxation system towards a schedular or more accurately a dual 
income taxation system. OECD member states have a varied tax structure as 
the importance of direct taxation differs from country to country. The ratio of 
income tax to total tax revenue varies from just over 10% (Slovakia) to over 
50% (Denmark). Despite the different proportions, between 2000 and 2005 
the tax burden on salaries fell on average for all salary categories in OECD 
countries. According to OECD (2006) data, over this period the taxation of the 
lowest salaries fell by 0.8 percentage points, while taxation on the highest 
salaries fell by 0.7 percentage points. The top marginal tax rate over the period 
ranged from 47% (average top marginal tax rate in OECD countries in 2000) to 
43.3% (2005). There was also a significant reduction in the number of tax 
brackets and the move towards a dual taxation system. The dual income tax 
system means that capital income is taxed at a flat tax rate, and not with 
progressive rates like other income. Although in the past one could not speak 
of a comprehensive income tax system, as most countries had a special tax 
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regime for specific types of income (recognising different costs and 
deductions for different income types), all income was still taxed using a 
progressive scale. 
The lowest top marginal tax rate for personal income tax is in Slovakia, 
where it is 19% (the flat tax rate), while the highest is in Denmark, where it is 
59%. The average top marginal tax rate in the EU is 41.7% - in the EU15 it is 
47.19% while in the new 10 states the average is 32.6%. Austria, Belgium 
and Slovenia all have a top rate of 50%, while the Netherlands (52%), Finland 
(52.12%) and Sweden (56.5%) all have rates above 50% as well as Demark. 
Dual taxation systems are found in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the 
UK (for more see Blaži} and Ba{agi}, 2005). 
There is also a trend towards reducing tax rates in the taxation of corpora-
te income tax. Of considerable interest are studies indicating that if a country 
lowers its tax rate by 1%, then foreign direct investment amount increases by 
3.3% to 4.3% (Drezgi}, 2005). OECD studies have shown that over the period 
1985-1994 the number of direct investments in Caribbean islands and islands 
in the South Pacific increased fivefold, and reached USD 200 billion (OECD, 
1998).  
 
 
4. Slovenia and its neighbouring countries 
 
In the last two years Slovenia has witnessed the continual reform of its 
tax system. In 2004 a large-scale reform of personal income tax, corporate 
income tax and the tax process was carried out. Soon after the changes were 
introduced it became clear that they included a number of deficiencies. Some 
corrections were then made, and more changes will follow in 2007. One such 
correction to the income tax system, which actually came into force before the 
2005 changes, was the taxation of capital gains from shares forming a 
substantial shareholding, as it was clear that unfavourable taxation of capital 
gains would lead to capital flow away from Slovenia. Most substantial 
shareholders sold shares to newly established companies abroad, mainly in 
favourable tax regimes.  
Ignoring the existence of tax competition therefore had negative 
consequences for Slovenia’s tax system. The correction of the 2004 reforms 
recognised the existence of tax competition, and was aimed at increasing the 
competitiveness of the Slovenian economy and simplifying tax procedures. IMD 
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world competitiveness 2005 yearbook listed 20 weakest criteria in Slovenia 
among which 5 were connected with taxation (employee’s social security con-
tribution rate, effective personal income tax rate, collected total tax revenues, 
investment incentives and real personal taxes), while corporate tax rate on 
profit was listed as one of 20 strongest criteria.   
To make it easier to evaluate the changes made to tax legislation over the 
last year and the changes forecast for this year, the paper will now review 
personal income tax and corporate income tax in Slovenia’s four neighbouring 
countries (Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy), which may be seen as direct 
competitors to the Slovenian tax system. It remains true, of course, that 
today’s globalisation process does not limit competition to neighbouring 
countries alone, particularly in relation to mobile capital.   
 
4.1 Personal income tax  
In all four neighbouring countries personal income is taxed according to 
the global income principle with a progressive scale. All four countries also 
have some form of dual system (some forms of income taxed at a set final 
rate). Slovenia and Austria have the highest marginal tax rate, followed by 
Croatia, Italy and Hungary. Slovenia has the highest number of tax brackets, 
while Hungary has the lowest. Austria’s bottom marginal tax rate is the 
lowest, while Italy has the highest bottom rate (see Table 1). Table 1 indicates 
that taxpayers in Slovenia reach the top tax bracket more quickly than 
taxpayers in Austria, while taxpayers with the lowest income exceed the first 
tax bracket relatively quickly. Italy, where the lower threshold is highest, also 
has the highest bottom marginal tax rate, however this is somewhat mitigated 
by the allowance system.  
All countries allow certain expenses to be used to lower the tax base, 
especially those relating to education and various forms of health insurance 
and additional pension saving. Austria permits a set percentage of expenses, 
but also sets a maximum amount for the allowance. Other countries set a 
maximum amount for individual allowance groups, except for donations in 
Croatia for which there is a set percentage. Slovenia has a set percentage 
without a maximum amount for some forms of income. Croatia offers general 
allowances in the form of a reduced tax base that differ according to the 
taxpayer category (employee, pensioner, the region of residence), while Italy 
also has different allowances for different taxpayer groups, though they only 
apply to people not exceeding a set income limit (e.g. EUR 33 500 for 
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employees in 2006). Their tax allowance system also allows employees not 
exceeding the general allowance limit of EUR 7500 to remain untaxed. This 
mitigates the high bottom marginal tax rate. A similar system applies in 
Slovenia and Croatia, however in Slovenia there is a general allowance for all 
taxpayer groups, and then specific allowances available for different groups. In 
both countries this allowance is significantly lower than in Italy; in 2006 it was 
EUR 2552 in Slovenia and EUR 2656 in Croatia. Slovenia, Croatia and Italy also 
permit tax allowances for dependent family members, with set amounts 
reducing the tax base. All forms of tax allowance mentioned above involve 
reducing the tax base.  
 
Table 1: Personal income tax in 2006 for Slovenia and four 
neighbouring countries 
 
Country 
Top marginal 
tax rate (%) 
Lower margin 
for top income 
tax bracket  (in 
EUR1) 
Number 
of tax 
brackets 
Lowest 
marginal tax 
rate (%) 
Upper margin 
for lowest tax 
bracket (EUR) 
Austria 50 51 000 4 0 10 000 
Croatia 45 37 178 4 15 5 311 
Italy 43 100 000 4 23 26 000 
Hungary 36 5 556 2 18 5 556 
Slovenia 50 44 012 5 16 5 539 
Slovenia* 41 13 600 3 16 6 800 
Vir: IBFD, European Tax Surveys, 2006 
* in 2007 
 
Austria has a general allowance (as well as specific allowances for 
different groups), and allowances for dependents, while employees can also 
have expenses for travel to work recognised. All allowances are set amounts, 
with some amounts reducing the tax base, while other reduced the tax liability 
(tax credits). It is a combination of two forms of allowance with the same 
purpose. Italy and Hungary also offer tax credits that reduce tax for various 
                                                 
1 The following exchange rates apply: one euro is equivalent to 239.64 Slovenian tolars; 7.23 
Croatian kunas and 278.99 Hungarian forints.  
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expenses and income up to a maximum amount, however in Hungary income 
tax payers with income over EUR 23 300 are not entitled to these credits for 
expenses, and the same applies to individual expenditure, as there are also 
maximum income limits after which these credits do not apply. The only tax 
credit in Slovenia that actually reduces the tax liability is for pensioners (IBFD, 
2006).   
As the allowance system differs between these countries, it is difficult to 
draw a direct comparison for individual taxation. Nevertheless, the paper sets 
out below the tax liabilities for an individual with a high income and with a low 
income. To simplify the comparison, it involves a taxpayer whose income 
derives solely from a salary, who is single without children and who does not 
claim tax allowances and credits for various expenses. Table 2 gives a 
calculation of the income tax return in each country for an individual with high 
income, when the net tax base is EUR 46 000 (income tax calculated 
according to the tax brackets for each country only), and when the taxable 
income is EUR 46 000 (general allowance taken into consideration).  
 
Table 2: Tax liability of high income individual  
 
Country Net tax base EUR 46 000 
Taxable income EUR 46 000 (general 
allowance considered) 
Austria 14 905 14 503 
Croatia* 15 123 13 928 
Italy* 13 300 13 300 
Hungary 15 560 15 560 
Slovenia 16 788 15 576 
Slovenia** 16 208 15 060 
*excluding local taxes 
** in 2007 
 
The table shows that in both cases the tax liability for an individual is 
highest in Slovenia, despite the fact that in Italy and Hungary taxpayers earning 
over a set taxable income are not eligible for the general allowance. The 
difference in taxation between Slovenia and rest in the first example is as 
much as EUR 3000, and in all cases is over EUR 1000. Higher earners in 
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Slovenia are therefore taxed much more than in neighbouring countries.  The 
tax changes in 2007 does not drasticly change situation. 
The position of taxpayers with a lower income is different. They face the 
heaviest tax burden in Hungary – if the general allowance is considered – or in 
Italy if one considers the net tax base, as Italy has the highest bottom marginal 
tax rate. A Slovenian taxpayer with a net tax base of EUR 5500 is in third place 
in this comparison, paying over EUR 300 less than the Italian taxpayer and 
EUR 100 less than the Hungarian, however the Italian’s taxable income is 
much higher than the Slovene’s in that case. Taking the general allowance into 
account and fixing the taxable income at EUR 5500, the Slovenian taxpayer 
pays just over EUR 100 less than the Hungarian, somewhat more than the 
Croatian, while the Austrian and Italian taxpayer actually pay no tax. A taxpayer 
not reaching a taxable income of EUR 2522 (the general allowance in 
Slovenia), is not taxed in any country except Hungary, where income tax of 
EUR 216 would still have to be paid. 
 
Table 3: Tax liability of low income individual  
 
Country Net tax base EUR 5500 
Taxable income EUR 5500 (general 
allowance considered) 
Austria 0 0 
Croatia* 844 427 
Italy* 1.265 0 
Hungary 990 603 
Slovenia 880 476 
Slovenia** 880 432 
*excluding local taxes 
** in 2007 
 
In all countries, taxpayers pay social contributions defined according to 
income levels. The rates differ and range from 10% (Italy) to 22.5% (Slovenia). 
The highest income at which contributions are still paid is fixed in Austria and 
Croatia, while in Hungary there is a minimum daily amount required for 
pension contributions. Social security contributions already paid are not part of 
the tax base for personal income tax in any of the countries.  
The salary burden is determined by taking into account the average rate 
of income tax and social security contributions (employees and employers) and 
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is given by Eurostat for EU members for low incomes, and by the OECD for 
average and low and high incomes. According to OECD data for 2005 (for Austria, 
Italy and Hungary) the tax wedge on average production salaries is highest in 
Hungary (49.2%), and lowest in Italy (45.4%), while in Austria it was 47.4% 
(OECD Tax Database, 2006). If the tax wedge on the average salary in Slovenia 
and Croatia is assessed in a similar manner, the values would be higher than 50% 
in Slovenia and less in Croatia. This reveals that Slovenia has the highest tax 
wedge for average earner. As initially mentioned, all countries observed have 
some form of dual taxation system. The introduction of the dual system in 
Slovenia from 2006 brought Slovenia’s system into line with its neighbours.  
Austria has a final income tax rate of 25% for dividends and taxable 
interest. Capital gains generated from the sale of shares and other securities 
after being held for one year and real estate held for 10 years is not taxed, 
while other capital gains and capital gains from the sale of shares that form 
substantial shareholding are taxed according to a progressive scale.  
In Croatia dividends will not be taxed from 2006 onwards, taxable interest 
(primarily interest on loans) are taxed at a final rate of 35%, while capital gains 
from the sale of real estate are not taxed after being held for three years. The 
sale of real estate before the three-year time limit is taxed with a final rate of 
25%. Capital gains from the sale of movable property and securities are not 
subject to tax. 
In Italy dividends held by small shareholders are taxed at a final rate of 
12.5%, while dividends from substantial shareholding are taxed according to a 
progressive scale, however dividends received are eligible for an allowance of 
60%. A similar regime applies to capital gains generated from the sale of shares 
and other securities. Capital gains generated from the sale of real estate become 
tax exempt when the taxpayer has owned the property for over five years, 
otherwise a progressive scale applies. Interest is taxed at a final rate of 27%, 
except for interest on lending which is taxed according to a progressive scale, and 
interest on government and other bonds, which is taxed at 12.5%.  
In Hungary a total of 30% of dividends are taxed at a final rate of 25%, 
while the remaining dividends are taxed at a final rate of 35%. There is a zero-
tax rate on interest, except for interest on loans to companies, if they exceed a 
set amount. Capital gains from the sale of shares and other securities are 
taxed at a final rate of 25%, capital gains from the sale of real estate are also 
taxed at 25%, but the rate reduces by 10% after six years’ ownership, and 
reduces by a further 10% each year after that so there is no tax on real estate 
owned for more than 15 years. Hungary is planning changes for 2007, setting 
the final income tax rate for interest and capital gains at 20%.  
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In Slovenia, dividends, taxable interest and capital gains are taxed at a flat 
final rate of 20%. This level is only reduced for capital gains depending on the 
length of ownership, with no taxation after 20 years. Although the level is 
generally lower than in other countries, one can conclude that capital gains 
from the sale of real estate are subject to a less favourable tax regime, as they 
only become tax exempt after 20 years, with the period being shorter in the 
other four countries. Dividends are taxed higher in Austria and Hungary, 
interest higher in Austria and Croatia, and on some forms of interest in Italy. 
Austria has the most favourable tax regime for capital gains from the sales of 
shares after a period of year (unless they form a substantial shareholding), 
followed by Croatia (with exemption after three years’ ownership), followed by 
Slovenia at 20%, which offers exemption after 20 years (IBFD, 2006).  
The table below gives a country-by-county comparison for an individual 
with the following income: 
• A: EUR 200 dividends (not from substantial shareholding); 
• B: EUR 200 interest on time deposit; 
• C: EUR 500 capital gains from sale of real estate (owned for 5.1 years) 
• D: EUR 500 capital gains from sale of real estate (owned for 15.1 years); 
• E: EUR 200 capital gains from sale of shares (not from substantial 
shareholding; owned for 1.1 years); 
• F: EUR 200 capital gains from sale of shares (not from substantial 
shareholding; owned for 3.1 years). 
 
Table 4: Taxation of dividends, interest and capital gains  
 
Income Austria Croatia Italy Hungary Slovenia 
A 50 0 25 64 40 
B 50 02 54 0 03 (40) 
C 01 0 0 125 100 
D 0 0 0 0 25 
E 0 02 25 50 40 
F 0 0 25 50 40 
Total 100 0 129 289 245 (285) 
1Austria: EUR 500 is taxable on a progressive scale, but the bottom marginal tax rate is 0%. 
2Croatia: interest on savings and capital gains from selling securities are tax exempt. 
3Slovenia: up to SIT 300 000 tax exempt in 2006 and up to SIT 150 000 in 2007; after 2008 
interest will be taxed in full (values in bracket).  
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4.2 Corporate income tax  
When Slovenia introduced corporate income tax it emphasised that its 
25% rate was one of the lowest in Europe. However, the limit has never been 
changed, while its fellow new EU member states significantly lowered their 
rates before EU entry. Cyprus lowered its rate from 25% to 10%, Latvia from 
22% to 15%, Lithuania from 24% to 15%, Poland from 34% to 19 %, the 
Czech Republic from 31% to 28%, Hungary from 17.5% to 16%, and Slovakia 
from 29% to 19%. In addition to these countries (excluding the Czech 
Republic), Ireland (12.5%) and Estonia are also among the EU countries with 
the lowest corporate tax rate. Although other countries do not have lower tax 
rates, they have nevertheless been lowered in other countries (e.g. in Austria 
from 34% to 25% in 2005). 
Of all the countries observed, Italy has the highest corporate tax rate, 
while Hungary has the lowest. Austria has the same rate as Slovenia, but in 
addition to the tax rate there is a minimum tax contribution that companies 
must pay, depending on their legal status. The rates are given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Tax rates for corporate income tax  
 
Country Tax rate  
Austria 25 
Croatia 20 
Italy 33 
Hungary 16 
Slovenia 25 
Slovenia* 23 
Source: IBFD, European Tax Surveys, 2006 
* in 2007 
 
All the observed countries recognise a range of allowances and incentives 
when defining the tax base. Austria permits accelerated depreciation, 
allowances for expenditure on research and development, employee training 
and new share issues. All the incentives have a maximum allowance limit. 
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Croatia offers allowances for entertainment expenses, employment and 
donations, and a range of incentives for new companies and investments, as 
in some circumstances companies can pay at a lower tax rate. Lower tax rates 
apply to set regions and free zones. In Hungary companies can make use of 
allowances for investments, employment and expenditure on research and 
development. Most of these have a maximum specified amount. Under 
certain conditions companies may also be eligible for a lower tax rate. In Italy, 
in addition to a set percentage for entertainment expenses, there are also 
allowances for employment and research. Accelerated depreciation is 
permitted and there is an allowance limit for reserves. Slovenia has similar 
allowances and incentives to its neighbours, offering allowances for set costs 
of entertainment expenses, as well as allowances for donations, investments, 
employment, and research and development. Slovenia according to stated do 
not differ much from other neighbouring countries.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Predictions of what form the latest changes to Slovenia’s tax code will 
take suggest that the existence of tax competition is no longer seen as 
negligible, as most of the changes tend towards simplifying and reducing tax 
rates, and – for personal income tax – reducing the number of tax brackets. 
Reducing the top marginal tax rate will reduce the burden on higher earners, 
which the comparison has shown are taxed highest in Slovenia. The lowering 
of the bottom marginal tax rate, even if the general allowance were raised to 
one million tolars (EUR 4173), would leave lower earners significantly worse 
off, particularly in comparison to Italy and Austria, where many Slovenes living 
in border areas already work.  
Increasing the standard VAT rate to over 20% could also have a negative 
impact, as none of the neighbouring countries has a higher rate at present. 
Italy, Austria and Hungary all have two reduced VAT rates, while Croatia even 
has a zero rate for essential goods.  
It does not make sense when preparing tax legislation to worsen the 
position of taxpayers that are currently in a comparable position at least with 
neighbouring countries, while it does make sense to improve the position of 
those currently in a poorer comparable position, i.e. those earning higher 
incomes.  
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Doc. dr. Maja Klun je julija 2002 uspe{no zagovarjala doktorsko disertacijo in tako 
pridobila naziv doktorja znanosti s podro~ja ekonomije, leta 2005 pa je bila prvi~ izvo-
ljena v docentko za podro~je ekonomike javnega sektorja. Njena poglavitna raziskova-
nja so s podro~ja davkov, ciljno usmerjenega prora~una in merjenja uspe{nosti in 
u~inkovitosti v javnem sektorju. 
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 POVZETEK 
Ali je dav~na reforma nujna zaradi  
»dav~ne« konkurence? 
 
Proces globalizacije povzro~a med drugim tudi »dav~no konkurenco«. 
Dav~na konkurenca je splo{no definirana kot tekmovanje nacionalnih 
gospodarstev za pove~anje njihove konkuren~nosti in privabljanja tujih 
investicij s pomo~jo dav~ne politike. Ukrepi dav~ne politike, ki bistveno 
nižje obdav~ujejo mobilni kapital ali tuji kapital, so ozna~eni kot {kodljiva 
dav~na konkurenca. ^eprav razli~na svetovna združenja in organizacije 
(tudi OECD in EU) stalno opozarjajo na negativne posledice {kodljive 
dav~ne konkurence, se v zadnjem ~asu poudarjajo tudi pozitivni u~inki le-
te. Dejstvo je, da je ve~ina držav v zadnjem desetletju znižala najvi{je 
dav~ne stopnje pri obdav~enju dohodkov posameznikov in odstopila od 
celovitega ali prikrito cedularnega pristopa obdav~evanja dohodkov 
posameznikov, in sicer v smeri cedularnega (ve~inoma dualnega) 
pristopa, v katerem dohodki iz kapitala niso obdav~eni po progresivnih 
stopnjah. Podobni trendi se pojavljajo tudi pri obdav~evanju dobi~kov 
podjetij. Veliko {tevilo vzhodnoevropskih držav je odpravilo progresivno 
obdav~enje dohodkov posameznikov in uvedlo enotne dav~ne stopnje, 
~eprav pri {e vedno visokih prispevkih za socialno varnost ne moremo 
govoriti o enotni dav~ni stopnji, ampak o posebnem dualnem modelu 
obdav~evanja delovnih dohodkov.   
V Sloveniji smo v zadnjih treh letih soo~eni prakti~no z nenehnim 
spreminjanjem dav~ne zakonodaje ter polemikami o uvedbi enotne 
dav~ne stopnje. ^eprav med strokovnjaki ni enotnega stali{~a o dav~ni 
reformi (ali reformi reforme), velja enotno mnenje, da so delovni dohodki 
dav~no preobremenjeni, posebej visoki in je zato razbremenitev dela 
nujna. Slovenija ni izolirana enota v procesu globalizacije in dav~na 
konkurenca vodi do teženj razbremenitve ne samo dohodkov, ki izhajajo iz 
zaposlitve, ampak tudi razbremenitev dohodkov podjetij in dohodkov, ki 
izhajajo iz kapitala.  
V prispevku so prikazani razli~ni pogledi na obstoj dav~ne konkurence 
ter povezanost z dav~nimi reformami. Osrednji del prispevka prikazuje 
primerjave obdav~enja zavezanca v Sloveniji in v njenih sosednjih 
državah (Avstriji, Hrva{ki, Italiji in Madžarski).  
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V vseh sosednjih državah je dohodek fizi~nih oseb obdav~en po 
na~elu svetovnega dohodka in s progresivno lestvico (stopni~asta 
progresija). V vseh državah imajo dolo~eno obliko dualnega sistema (ne-
kateri dohodki so obdav~eni s kon~nim davkom). Najvi{jo mejno dav~no 
stopnjo imata Slovenija in Avstrija, sledijo Hrva{ka, Italija in Madžarska. 
Slovenija ima najve~ dav~nih razredov, najmanj pa Madžarska. Najnižjo 
spodnjo mejno dav~no stopnjo ima Avstrija, najvi{jo pa Italija. Dav~ni 
zavezanci v Sloveniji hitreje dosežejo zgornjo mejo obdav~itve kot zavez-
anci v Avstriji, po drugi strani pa zavezanci z najnižjimi dohodki relativno 
hitro presežejo prvi dohodninski razred. V vseh državah priznavajo 
dolo~ene izdatke, ki znižujejo dav~no osnovo, predvsem za izobraževanje 
in razli~ne oblike zdravstvenih zavarovanj in dodatnih pokojninskih zava-
rovanj. V Avstriji so dolo~eni odstotki izdatkov, ki se priznajo, vendar pa je 
isto~asno dolo~en tudi maksimalni znesek olaj{ave. V drugih državah so 
dolo~eni maksimalni zneski za posamezno skupino olaj{av, razen za 
donacije v Hrva{ki, kjer je dolo~en odstotek. V Sloveniji imamo dolo~ene 
odstotke brez zgornjih omejitev pri nekaterih dohodkih. Ker je sistem 
olaj{av v državah razli~en, je primerjavo obdav~enja posameznika težko 
enostavno prikazati. Zaradi poenostavitve primerjave gre za zavezanca, ki 
ima edini dohodek pla~o, je samski, brez otrok in ne uveljavlja olaj{av za 
razli~ne izdatke. V ~lanku je prikazan izra~un dohodnine v posamezni 
državi za posameznika z visokimi dohodki, in sicer v primeru, ko je 
njegova neto dav~na osnova 46.000 EUR (zgolj izra~un dohodnine glede 
na lestvico v posamezni državi) in ko je njegov obdav~ljivi dohodek 46.000 
EUR (upo{tevana je splo{na olaj{ava). Iz izra~una je razvidno, da je v obeh 
primerih dav~na obremenitev zavezanca najvi{ja v Sloveniji, kljub temu, 
da Italija in Madžarska ne priznavata splo{ne olaj{ave za zavezance, ki 
presežejo dolo~en obdav~ljivi dohodek. Razlika v obdav~itvi v prvem 
primeru presega 3.000 EUR in ni manj{a od 1.000 EUR, ~e upo{tevamo 
prvi primer. Visoki zaslužki v Sloveniji so torej bistveno bolj obdav~eni kot 
v sosednjih državah. Druga~en je položaj zavezancev z nizkimi dohodki. Ti 
so najbolj obdav~eni v Madžarski, ko upo{tevamo splo{no olaj{avo ter v 
primeru neto dav~nih osnov v Italiji, ki ima tudi najvi{jo spodnjo mejno 
dav~no stopnjo. Slovenski zavezanec je z neto dav~no osnovo v vi{ini 
5.500 EUR na tretjem mestu in pla~a dobrih 300 EUR manj kot italijanski 
zavezanec in 100 EUR manj kot madžarski, vendar pa je obdav~ljivi 
dohodek pri italijanskem zavezancu precej vi{ji kot pri slovenskem v tem 
primeru. V kolikor upo{tevamo splo{no olaj{avo in dolo~imo 5.500 EUR 
kot obdav~ljivi dohodek, pa slovenski zavezanec pla~uje le dobrih 100 
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EUR manj kot madžarski, nekoliko ve~ od hrva{kega, medtem ko avstrijski 
in italijanski zavezanec ne pla~ata davka.  
V vseh državah zavezanci pla~ujejo socialne prispevke, ki so dolo~eni 
v stopnjah od dohodka. Stopnje so razli~ne, in sicer se gibljejo med 10 % 
(v Italiji) in 22,5 % (v Sloveniji). Najvi{ji dohodek od katerega se {e 
pla~ujejo prispevki je dolo~en v Avstriji in Hrva{ki, v Madžarski pa je 
dolo~en minimalni dnevni znesek za pokojninsko zavarovanje. Pla~ani 
prispevki za socialno varnost niso del dav~ne osnove za dohodnino v 
nobeni državi.  
Kot je že omenjeno v za~etku, vse obravnavane države poznajo dualni 
sistem obdav~itve. Uvedba dualnega sistema v Sloveniji z letom 2006 je 
približala slovensko obdav~itev sosednjim državam. ^eprav je stopnja 
ve~inoma nižja kot v drugih državah, pa lahko zaklju~imo, da so kapitalski 
dobi~ki od prodaje nepremi~nin manj ugodno obravnavani v Sloveniji, saj 
so neobdav~eni {ele po 20 letih, v vseh drugih obravnavanih državah pa 
je ta doba kraj{a. Dividende so bolj obdav~ene v Avstriji in Madžarski, 
obresti pa v Avstriji, Hrva{ki in nekatere v Italiji. Kapitalski dobi~ki od 
prodaje vrednostnih papirjev so po preteku enega leta lastni{tva 
najugodneje dav~no obravnavani v Avstriji (~e ne gre za pretežne 
lastni{ke deleže), sledi Hrva{ka (z oprostitvijo po treh letih lastni{tva), z 20 
% stopnjo jima sledi Slovenija, ki tudi omogo~a oprostitev po 20 letih 
lastni{tva.  
Od vseh obravnavnih držav ima najvi{jo dav~no stopnjo obdav~enja 
dobi~ka podjetij Italija, nižjo od Slovenije pa imata Madžarska in Hrva{ka. 
Vse države poznajo podobne olaj{ave in vspodbude, tako da v primeru 
obdav~enja podjetij Slovenija ne izstopa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
